

Refutation of 0-1 laws in real-valued, probabilistic logics

We assume the method and apparatus of Meth8/VL4 with Tautology as the designated proof value, **F** as contradiction, **N** as truthity (non-contingency), and **C** as falsity (contingency). The 16-valued truth table is row-major and horizontal, or repeating fragments of 128-tables, sometimes with table counts, for more variables. (See ersatz-systems.com.)

LET \sim Not, \neg ; $+$ Or, \vee , \cup , \sqcup ; $-$ Not Or; $\&$ And, \wedge , \cap , \sqcap , \cdot , \circ , \otimes ; \setminus Not And;
 $>$ Imply, greater than, \rightarrow , \Rightarrow , \mapsto , $>$, \supset , \Rightarrow ; $<$ Not Imply, less than, \in , $<$, \subset , \varsubsetneq , \neq , \leftarrow , \lesssim ;
 $=$ Equivalent, \equiv , $:=$, \Leftrightarrow , \leftrightarrow , \triangleq , \approx , \simeq ; $@$ Not Equivalent, \neq , \oplus ;
 $\%$ possibility, for one or some, \exists , $\exists!$, \diamond , M ; $\#$ necessity, for every or all, \forall , \square , L ;
 $(z=z)$ **T** as tautology, \top , ordinal 3; $(z@z)$ **F** as contradiction, \emptyset , Null, \perp , zero;
 $(\%z\>\#z)$ **N** as non-contingency, Δ , ordinal 1; $(\%z\<\#z)$ **C** as contingency, ∇ , ordinal 2;
 $\sim(y < x)$ ($x \leq y$), ($x \subseteq y$), ($x \sqsubseteq y$); $(A=B)$ ($A \sim B$).
 Notes: for clarity, we usually distribute quantifiers onto each designated variable; and for ordinal arithmetic, the result is implied.

From: Compton, K.J. (1988, 1999). 0-1 laws in logic and combinatorics.
researchgate.net/publication/239662281_0-1_laws_in_logic_and_combinatorics/link/00b4953232bc770fec000000/download_kjc@umich.edu

Abstract This is a survey of logical results concerning random structures. A class of relational structures on which a (finitely additive) probability measure has been defined has a 0-1 law for a particular logic if every sentence of that logic has probability either 0 or 1. The measure may be an asymptotic probability on finite structures or generated on a class of infinite structures by assigning fixed probabilities to independently occurring properties. Conditions under which all sentences of a logic have a probability, and under which 0-1 laws occur, are examined. Also, the complexity of computing probabilities of sentences is considered.

2 Logics

transitive relation extending the relation θ . For example, consider the logic whose only extralogical symbol is a binary relation symbol E which we take to denote the edge relation on the class of graphs. The *TC* sentence

$$[X(x, y) \equiv \text{TC}(E(x, y))] \forall x, y (x \neq y \rightarrow X(x, y))$$

asserts that a graph is connected. X interprets the path relation in each graph: it holds between two points precisely when there is a path between them.

(2.1.1)

LET $p, q, r, s:$ x, y, z, E .
 X is taken as x' for $(p\&(\%s\>\#s))$.
 We ignore the symbol TC for transitive closure (logic), TCL .

$$(((p\&(\%s\>\#s))\&(p\&q))=(s\&(p\&q))) \& ((p@q)>((p\&(\%s\>\#s))\&(p\&q))) ;$$

$$\text{TFFC} \quad \text{TFFN} \quad \text{TFFC} \quad \text{TFFN} \quad \text{TCL} \quad (2.1.2)$$

Remark 2.1.2: Eq. 2.1.2 as rendered is *not* tautologous, to refute the sentence, denying transitive closure logic (TCL).

It is easy to see that *LFP* is at least as powerful as *TC*. For example, the transitive closure sentence above asserting connectivity in graph can be rewritten

$$[X(x, y) \equiv E(x, y) \vee \exists z(X(x, z) \wedge X(z, y))] \\ \forall x, y(x \neq y \rightarrow X(x, y))$$

in *LFP*.

(2.2.1)

$$(((p \& (\%s > \#s)) \& (p \& q)) = ((s \& (p \& q)) + (((p \& (\%s > \#s)) \& (s \& \%r)) \& \\ ((p \& (\%s > \#s)) \& (\%r \& q)))) \& ((\#p @ \#q) > ((p \& (\%s > \#s)) \& (\#p \& \#q)))) ; \\ \text{TCCC} \quad \text{TCCC} \quad \text{TCCN} \quad \text{TCCN} \quad \text{TCP} \quad (2.2.2)$$

Remark 2.2.2: Eq. 2.2.2 is *not* tautologous, to refute the sentence, denying least fixed point (LFP) logic. This further denies 0-1 laws in real-valued, probabilistic logics.

The following eight items are also denied: order theory, as particularly used by W. Oberschelp and R. Fagin; iterative logic (IT), refuted elsewhere here under induction and intensional logic; infinitary logic (IL), refuted elsewhere here under continuum hypothesis; class C structures; first-order FO 0-1 law logics; asymmetric probabilities of the foregoing; and the two real-valued logic classes below.

Most recently, these works are denied as based on the 1988 paper above:

Badia, G.; et al. (2022). New foundations of reasoning via real-valued first-order logics. arxiv.org/pdf/2207.00086.pdf

which is the follow on to:

Fagin, R. et al. (2021). Foundations of reasoning with uncertainty via real-valued logics. arxiv.org/pdf/2008.02429.pdf